TOC |  ID 

Anthrax


New York City Department of Health
Bureau of Communicable Disease

Medical Treatment and Response
to Suspected Anthrax:
Information for Health Care Providers
During Biologic Emergencies

July 2000 Draft


  1. Key Summary Points
  2. Introduction/Epidemiology
  3. Significance as a Bioterrorist Agent
  4. Clinical Manifestations
  5. Laboratory Diagnosis
  6. Handling Laboratory Specimens
  7. Treatment
  8. Isolation of Patients
  9. Disposal of Infectious Waste
  10. Autopsy and Handling of Corpses
  11. Management of Exposed Persons
  12. Reporting to the Health Department
  13. References
  14. Summary Table on Antibiotic Treatment and Prophylaxis




ALL SUSPECT CASES OF ANTHRAX MUST BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO
THE BUREAU OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE:
During Business Hours: 212-788-9830
After Hours (Nights, Weekends and Holidays): 212-POISONS


  1. KEY SUMMARY POINTS

    Epidemiology:

    Clinical:

    Diagnosis:

    Treatment:

    Prophylaxis:

    Patient Isolation:

    top of page



    ALL SUSPECT CASES OF ANTHRAX MUST BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO
    THE BUREAU OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE:
    During Business Hours: 212-788-9830
    After Hours (Nights, Weekends and Holidays): 212-POISONS




  2. Introduction/Epidemiology          

    Anthrax is a disease caused by Bacillus anthracis which can infect most warm-blooded animals, including man. Transmission to humans usually occurs through contact with infected animals or contaminated animal products. Humans become infected by inoculation, inhalation, or ingestion of the bacterium. In humans, naturally-occurring anthrax primarily involves the skin or rarely, the lungs or the gastrointestinal tract. The bacillus produces a resistant spore which could be dispersed as a small particle aerosol. In the event of a biologic terrorist attack, aerosolization is the most likely mode of transmission, and inhalational anthrax would be the predominant form of disease affecting persons exposed to the aerosol.

    The spore form of B. anthracis is highly resistant to physical and chemical agents. The organism has been shown to persist for years in factories contaminated during the processing of infected animal products. Soil, animal feed, and to a lesser extent, ground water are the major reservoirs for anthrax.

    Although human anthrax is infrequent and sporadic in the United States and most other industrialized countries, human cases (primarily cutaneous) continue to be reported from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Although anthrax-contaminated soil exists in many foci throughout the United States, the number of cases reported annually in has declined throughout the last five decades; five human cases (all cutaneous anthrax) were reported between 1981-1996. There have been no reports of anthrax in New York City in over 50 years.

    A suspected case of anthrax in a patient without a clear exposure history (e.g., a traveler returning from an area with known animal cases or a person with exposure to imported animal hides) may be the first clue of a bioterrorist attack. Therefore, even a single, suspect case should prompt immediate notification of the Bureau of Communicable Disease (Business hours: 212-788-9830; After hours: 212-764-7667)

    Person to person transmission of anthrax is extremely rare.

    top of page


  3. Significance as a Potential Bioterrorist Agent          

    Anthrax has been weaponized by many countries during the last 50 years, including the United States (during the 1950's) and Iraq during the Gulf War.

    top of page


  4. Clinical Manifestations            

    During an act of bioterrorism, release of an aerosol will be the most likely route of transmission. Given this, most exposed individuals will present with symptoms of inhalation anthrax with only a few, if any, having the cutaneous form of the disease. Gastrointestinal anthrax would be much less likely.

    Inhalation Anthrax presents as acute hemorrhagic mediastinitis after inhalation of airborne particles contaminated with B. anthracis spores. Inhalation anthrax does not present as an acute pneumonia.

    Cutaneous Anthrax: presents as a "malignant pustule or malignant carbuncle" resulting from introduction of the anthrax bacillus beneath the skin by inoculation or contamination of a pre-existent break in the skin.

    Gastrointestinal Anthrax: occurs after the ingestion of contaminated food, particularly raw or undercooked meat from infected animals. There has never been a case of gastrointestinal anthrax reported in the United States.

    Meningitis: Meningitis occurs in less than 5% of cases, and may be a complication of any form of anthrax (inhalational, gastrointestinal or cutaneous). Rarely does it occur without a primary focus. It is usually hemorrhagic.

    top of page


  5. Laboratory Diagnosis          




    Laboratory work with clinical specimens must be done under Biosafety Level 2
    conditions. If infection with Bacillus anthracis is suspected, please immediately call
    the New York City Bureau of Communicable Disease at 212-788-9830 to arrange for
    submission of specimens to an appropriate reference laboratory for confirmatory
    testing. After hours call the Poison Control Center at 212-POISONS (212-764-7667).




    **NOTE: In the event of a bioterrorist event, the anthrax strain may be penicillin resistant. There are currently no NCCLS standards for susceptibility testing for B. anthracis. Microbiology laboratories must alert the Bureau of Communicable Disease (212-788-9830, after hours 212-POISONS) as soon as B. anthracis is identified so that susceptibility testing at a national reference laboratory can be arranged. The results of susceptibility testing are crucial in guiding both therapy and prophylaxis for potentially infected persons.

    top of page

  6. Handling Laboratory Specimens          

    Biosafety Level 2 practices, containment equipment and facilities are recommended for procedures on clinical materials suspected as being positive for anthrax. Laboratory staff handling specimens from persons who might have anthrax must wear surgical gloves, protective gowns and shoe covers. Laboratory tests should be performed in Biological Safety Level 2 cabinets and blood cultures should be maintained in a closed system. Every effort should be made to avoid splashing or creating an aerosol, and protective eye wear and masks should be worn if work cannot be done in a Biological Safety Level 2 cabinet. A full-face mask respirator with a HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filter is an acceptable alternative to masks and protective eye wear, but use of this equipment is not mandatory.

    Accidental spills of potentially contaminated material should be decontaminated immediately by covering liberally with a disinfectant solution (5% hypochlorite or 10% formalin), left to soak for 30 minutes, and wiped up with absorbent material soaked in disinfectant. All biohazardous waste should be decontaminated by autoclaving. Contaminated equipment or instruments may be decontaminated with a hypochlorite solution, hydrogen peroxide, iodine, peracetic acid, 1% glutaraldehyde solution, formaldehyde, ethylene oxide, copper irradiation or other O.S.H.A. approved solutions, or by autoclaving or boiling for 10 minutes.

    top of page


  7. Treatment            

    The key to successful treatment is prompt administration of an antimicrobial at the first suspicion of anthrax. During a biologic emergency, before susceptibility is determined (which may take several days), assume penicillin and tetracycline resistance and treat with ciprofloxacin at 400 mg IV every 12 hours. Penicillin is the antibiotic of choice for treating infections with penicillin-sensitive anthrax.

    Treatment for Non-Pregnant Adults:

    Inhalation anthrax (this regimen also recommended for gastrointestinal and meningeal anthrax)

    Cutaneous anthrax

    Alternative Therapies

    *** In the event of severe penicillin allergy, documented resistance of Bacillus anthracis to penicillin, inability to administer the frequent IV dosing required for penicillin, or the exhaustion of penicillin supplies; Ciprofloxacin (400 mg IV every 12 hours), Ofloxacin (400 mg IV or orally every 8 to 12 hours), Levofloxacin (500 mg IV or orally every 24 hours) or Doxycycline (100 mg IV every 12 hours) (if proven susceptible) are the preferred alternatives.

    In addition, the following drugs have been shown to have in vitro activity against anthrax and could potentially be used as alternative agents in the event of an emergency, if the preferred antimicrobials listed above are unavailable or in short supply:

    erythromycin       aminoglycosides       vancomycin
    imipenem       cephalothin/cefazolin       chloramphenicol
    clindamycin       tetracycline       extended-spectrum penicillins

    *** In vitro testing suggests that B. anthracis is generally resistant to sulfamethoxazole, trimethoprim, cefuroxime, cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, ceftazadime, and aztreonam. Therefore, these antibiotics should not be used for treatment or prophylaxis of anthrax infection.***

    Therapy in pediatric patients and pregnant women

    Vaccination and Duration of Therapy

    top of page


  8. Isolation of Patients            

    Inhalation, cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax have never been transmitted directly from human-to-human. All staff should observe Standard Precautions when caring for patients with suspected or confirmed anthrax. In addition, the following is advised:

    top of page


  9. Disposal of Infectious Waste            

    Use of tracking forms, containment, storage, packaging, treatment and disposal methods should be based upon the same rules as all other regulated medical wastes.

    top of page


  10. Autopsy and Handling of Corpses            

    All postmortem procedures should be performed using Universal Precautions.

    top of page


  11. Management of Exposed Persons

    In the event of a bioterrorist release of Bacillus anthracis spores, it may be difficult to define who has been exposed. Once the site of the attack is determined, all persons at the site of the release or downwind of the release (assuming an aerosol dispersal) would be considered potentially exposed.

    Since inhalation anthrax does not spread from person to person, household and other contacts (such as healthcare workers caring for cases) of exposed persons are not considered exposed and do not require prophylaxis (unless they too were exposed to the aerosolized anthrax spores at the time of the attack).

    top of page


  12. Reporting to the Health Department            

    Human and animal anthrax are reportable diseases in New York City and New York State. All suspect human cases should be reported immediately by phone:

    top of page


  13. References          

    Benenson AS, ed. Control of Communicable Diseases Manual. 16th ed. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association; 1995:18-22.

    Brachman PS. Anthrax. In: Hoeprich PD, Jordan MC, Ronald AR., eds. Infectious Diseases: a treatise of infectious processes. 5th ed. Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company; 1994:1003-1008.

    Edward M. Anthrax. In: Feigin RD, Cherry JD, eds. Textbook of Pediatric Infectious Diseases. 3rd ed. Philadelphia, PA; 1992:1053-1056.

    Fleming DO, Richardson JH, Tulis JJ, Vesley D, eds. Laboratory Safety Principles and Practices. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: American Society for Microbiology;1995:324.

    Friedlander AM. Anthrax. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji ET, Franz DR, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General at TMM Publications; 1997:467-478.

    Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. Anthrax: Civilian Medical and Public Health Management following use of a Biological Weapon. JAMA 1999: (in press).

    LaForce FM. Anthrax. Clin Infect Dis. 1994;19:1009-1014.

    Lew D. Bacillus Anthracis (Anthrax). In: Mandell G, Bennett J, Dolin R, eds. Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases. 4th ed. New York: Churchill Livingstone; 1995:1885-1889.

    Meselson M, Guillemin J, Hugh-Jones M, et al. The Sverdlosk anthrax outbreak of 1979. Science 1994;226:1202-1208.

    Pile JC, Malone JD, Eitzen EM, Friedlander AM. Anthrax as a potential biological warfare agent. Arch Intern Med. 1998;158:429-434.

    Turnbull PCB, Kramer JM. Bacillus. In: Balows A, Haulser WJ, Herrman KL, Shadomy HJ, eds. Manual of Clinical Microbiology 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Society for Microbiology; 1991:298-299.

    US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Medical Management of Biological Casualties. 3rd Edition. Fort Detrick, MD. 1998.

    top of page


  14. Table 1: Inhalational Anthrax Treatment and Prophylaxis

    Therapy Prophylaxis*

    Adult Doses Adult Doses
    Susceptibility Results Unknown or Penicillin- Resistant** Ciprofloxacin 400mg IV q 8- 12h
    (Alternative quinolones include: ofloxacin 400mg IV q 8-12h or levofloxacin (500mg IV q 24h)

    Doxycycline 200mg IV x 1, then 100mg IV q 12h (if tetracycline-susceptible)
    Ciprofloxacin 500mg po bid
    (Alternative quinolones include: ofloxacin 400mg po q 8- 12h or levofloxacin (500mg po q 24h

    Doxycycline 100mg po bid (if tetracycline susceptible)
    Penicillin Susceptible Penicillin G 80,000 units per kg in 1st hour followed by 320,000 units/kg/day. (Average adult dose is 4 million units q 4hr or 2 million units q 2h)

    Amoxicillin 500mg IV q 8h
    Penicillin VK 30mg/kg/d in 4 divided doses

    Amoxicillin 500mg po q 8h

    Pediatric Doses Pediatric Doses
    Susceptibility results unknown or penicillin- resistant Ciprofloxacin 20-30mg/kg/day IV in 2 divided doses (maximum daily dose not to exceed 1 gram/d)

    Doxycycline (if ciprofloxacin not available) 4 mg/kg/d IV in 2 divided doses
    Ciprofloxacin 20-30mg/kg per day po divided in 2 doses

    Doxycycline 5mg/kg/per day in 2 divided doses
    Penicillin-susceptibility Penicillin G 250,000 units/kg per day IV administered every 4 hours

    Amoxacillin 500mg IV q 8h if > 20kg
    or
    40mg/kg per day IV divided into 3 doses if < 20kg
    Penicillin VK 30 mg/kg per day po administered in 4 divided doses

    Amoxicillin 500mg po q 8h if > 20kg
    or
    40mg/kg per day po divided in 3 doses if < 20kg



    * Antibiotic prophylaxis should be continued for 60 days if anthrax vaccine is not available (or if vaccine is available, antibiotics should be continued until 3rd dose of vaccine has been administered).

    ** In pregnant women, penicillin-resistant anthrax should be treated with ciprofloxacin. If doxycycline is used, liver function tests should be monitored closely.

    top of page


    July 2000


    Go to Communicable Diseases page || Health Topics || NYC DOH Home Page ||
    NYC.GOV Home Page || Mayor's Office || Business || Attractions || What's New || Search